Michigan Law Review
Volume 37

Issue 1

1938

LABOR LAW - WORKERS WHO STRUCK PRIOR TO EFFECTIVE
DATE OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT AS "EMPLOYEES"
WITHIN THE MEANING OF ACT
Edward J. Wendrow
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Edward J. Wendrow, LABOR LAW - WORKERS WHO STRUCK PRIOR TO EFFECTIVE DATE OF NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT AS "EMPLOYEES" WITHIN THE MEANING OF ACT, 37 MICH. L. REV. 144 (1938).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol37/iss1/17

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1 44

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 37

LABOR LAW WORKERS WHO STRUCK PRIOR TO EFFECTIVE DATE
OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT As "EMPLOYEES" WITHIN THE MEAN-

ACT - Prior to the passage of the Wagner Act, respondent's employees
went on strike when the respondent refused to negotiate with the union. There-
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upon respondent notified them they were all discharged and that the mill was
closing down. Subsequent to the effective date of the act, respondent still refused
to negotiate with the union and refused to hire any strikers who would not
sign a "yellow dog" contract. The National Labor Relations Board held the
refusal to negotiate and the discrimination in regard to hire to be violations
of section 8 (5) and (3) respectively of the act and, inter alia, ordered refastatement to the status of employees of all those who struck and whose positions
were filled by new employees hired to take their places; that other strikers should
be placed on a preferred list, to be hired when new openings should occur; and
finally, that all strikers be given back pay from the date of the "yellow dog"
notice. On application for enforcement of the order of the Board, held, one
judge dissenting even though respondent's employees were discharged prior to
the act, they still remained "employees" as defined in section 2 (3) and hence
the refusal to negotiate and the discrimination in regard to hire constituted
violations of the statute. National Labor Relations Board v. Carlisle Lumber
Co., (C. C. A. 9th, 1937) 94 F. (2d) 138,1 writ of certiorari denied, 58
S. Ct. 1045 (1938).
Irrespective of the definition of "employee" in the statute, it has long been
settled that the relation of employer-employee is not automatically terminated
for all purposes by a strike. 2 The relationship which then arises has been said
not to be that of the general relation of employer and employee, or that of
employer looking among strangers for employees, or that of employees seeking
from strangers employment.8 During the continuance of the strike the employees
have the anomalous status of "striking employees." 4 These principles have
been incorporated in the Wagner Act in section 2 (3), which defines an employee as "any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in
connection with any current labor dispute, or because of any unfair labor pracAffirming Carlisle Lumber Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 248 (1936).
Tri-City Central Trades Council v. American Steel Foundries, (C. C. A. 7th,
1916) 238 F. 728, modified in 257 U. S. 184, 42 S. Ct. 72 (1921); Greenfield ·v.
Central Labor Council, 104 Ore. 236, 192 P. 783, 207 P. 168 (1922); Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pacific Ry., (C. C. Wis. 1894) 60 F. 803, reversed on
other grounds sub nom. Arthur v. Oakes, (C. C. A. 7th, 1894) 63 F. 310; Giltner v.
Becker, 133 Kan. 170, 298 P. 780 (1931); State v. Personett, 114 Kan. 680, 220 P.
520 (1923); Fryns v. Fair Lawn Fur Dressing Co., 114 N. J. Eq. 462, 168
862
(1933); Michaelson v. United States, (C. C. A. 7th, 1923) 291 F. 940; Rex v.
Neilson, 44 N. S. 488 (1910). However, in Dail-Overland Co. v. Willys-Overland,
(D. C. Ohio, 1919) 263 F. 171, affd. sub nom. Quinlivan v. Dail-Overland Co.,
(C. C. A. 6th, 1921) 274 F. 56, where seven months had elapsed since the strike and
the plant was then operating at full capacity with more men than ever, it was held .the
strikers who still remained out were no longer employees within the Clayton Act,
authorizing picketing in disputes between employer and employee. One court went so
far as to hold that the instant the employees went on strike they were no longer "employees" under the same act. Canoe Creek Coal Co. v. Christman, (D. C. Ky. 1922)
281 F. 559. This decision, however, though reversed on other grounds .sub nom. Sandefur v. Canoe Creek Coal Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1923) 293 F. 379, was finally reversed
on this specific point in 266 U.S. 42, 45 S. Ct. 18 (1924).
11 Concurring opinion of Grosscup, J., in Iron Molders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers
Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1908) 166 F. 45 at 52.
4 Michaelson v. United States, (C. C. A. 7th, 1923) 291 F. 940.
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tice•••• " 5 Under the decisions of"the board this section has been interpreted
to entitle striking employees to the protection of the act regardless whether the
strike began prior 6 or subsequent 7 to the passage of the act. The fact that the
strikers no longer retained their status as employees in the eyes of the employer
at the time of the discrimination has been held immaterial, since the employer
has no power to alter the relation defined by the statute.8 Where there has
been no discharge and the strike has begun prior to the act, it is clear the employees may invoke the provisions of the act when there is a refusal to bargain
or a discrimination in regard to hire subsequent to the effective date of the
statute. This is because the acts complained of are not the practices which
caused the strike but the subsequent refusal to negotiate or the discrimination. 9
The fact that in the principal case the strikers were discharged prior to the act
also appears immaterial for the same reason. It is the subsequent refusal to
bargain and the discrimination, and not the discharge, which is the basis of complaint. The contention of the respondent and the dissenting judge that this
gives a retroactive application to the act does not appear tenable when section
2 ( 3 )1° is considered with section 2 ( 9) •11 It seems almost too clear for argu49 Stat. L. 449, § 2 (3) (1935f, 29 U.S. C. (Supp. 1937), § 152 (3).
National Casket Co., Inc., l N. L. R. B. 963 (1936); Jeffery-De Witt Insulator
Co., 1 N. L. R. B. 618 (1936); Alabama Mills, Inc., 2 N. L. R. B. 20 (1936);
Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., l N. L. R. B. 181 (1936); Alaska Juneau
Gold Mining Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 125 (1936).
7 Radiant Mills Co., 1 N. L. R. B. 274 (1936); Elbe File & Binder Co., Inc.,
2 N. L. R. B. 906 (1937); S & K Knee Pants Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 940 (1937); Bell
Oil & Gas Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 577 (1937); Cosmopolitan Shipping Co., Inc., 2 N. L.
R. B. 759 (1937); Globe Mail Service, Inc., 2 N. L. R. B. 610 (1937); Louis Hornick & Co., Inc., 2 N. L. R. B. 983 (1937); Millfay Manufacturing Co., Inc., 2
N. L. R. B. 919 (1937).
8 Sunshine Hosiery Mills, l N. L. R. B. 664 (1936); S. L. Allen & Co., Inc.,
1 N. L. R. B. 714 (1936); Algonquin Printing Co., 1 N. L. R. B. 264 (1936);
Radiant Mills Co., 1 N. L. R. B. 274 (1936).
9 The point was argued in Jeffery-De Witt Insulator Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, (C. C. A. 4th, 1937) 91 F. (2d) 134, cert. denied 58 S. Ct. 55, that the
act was being given retroactive effect by applying it to those strikers who went on strike
before the date of its passage. The court disposed of this contention by saying, 91 F.
(2d) at 139: "It is a sufficient answer to ~is that the dispute was current at the time
of the passage of the act and that, under the principles of law theretofore recognized,
the relationship between the company and its striking employees had not been so completely terminated as to have no further connection with the company's business or the
commerce in which it was engaged. The action of the Board was not predicated upon
anything that occurred prior to the passage of the act, but upon an unfair labor practice
which occurred ten days after its effective date, i.e., upon the refusal to bargain collectively with the representative of the employees, which occurred July l 5• •••" Also see
cases cited in note 6, supra. But see Fruehauf Trailer Co., l N. L. R. B. 68 (1935),
where the Board summarily concluded that since two of the men discharged for union
activities were discharged prior to the act it had no jurisdiction.
10 "The term 'employee' ... shall include any individual whose work has ceased
as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute, or because of any
unfair labor practice.•.." 49 Stat. L. 449, § 2 (3) (1935), 29 U. S. C. (Supp.
1937), § 152 (3).
11 "The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms, tenure or
5
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ment that a labor dispute is "current" 12 between an employer and his "employees" when the latter are refusing to return to work because of the refusal
to negotiate with the union. From the standpoint of policy, any doubts on the
matter should be resolved in favor of this construction when it is considered
that the contrary view would take many disputes which originated prior to the
act out of its operation even though they are still causing an interference with
interstate commerce. It should also be noted that the order of the board compelling reinstatement of the strikers could have been affirmed on another provision of the statute. The condition of re-employment imposed on the strikers,
namely, the signing of a "yellow dog" contract, constituted a clear violation
of section 8 (3).18 Since this section is not limited to those who are employees
at the time of the discrimination, but forbids discrimination in regard to hire
generally,14 it appears that the court has reached a correct result,15 in sustaining
conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of
employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of
employer and employee." 49 Stat. L. 449, § 2 ( 9) (1935), 29 U. S. C. (Supp.
1937), § 152 (9).
12 It is not necessary that the dispute still be in progress at the time of the board's
hearing to be "current'' within the meaning of the act, since the word refers to the
time the strikers seek to assert their rights and does not require that the dispute be
existing at the present time. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., l N. L. R. B.
181 (1936). But see Mooresville Cotton Mills v. National Labor Relations Board,
(C. C. A. 4th, 1938) 94 F. (2d) 61, where it was held that striking employees who
had obtained equivalent employment elsewhere ceased to be employees within the
meaning of section 2 (3) because the dispute was no longer current as to them. This
decision is criticized in 6 INTERNATIONAL JurumcAL AssN. MONTHLY BULLETIN,
118 (1938).
13 "By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization .•.•" 49 Stat. L. 449, § 8 (3) (1935), 29 U.S. C. (Supp. 1937), § 158 (3).
14 In Algonquin Printing Co., 1 N. L. R. B. 264 (1936), a union leader was laid
off when the plant shut down. When it opened up again he was refused employment.
The defendant contended that since his work did not cease as a consequence of a current labor dispute, but by reason of the closing of the plant due to depressed business
conditions, a refusal to employ him did not constitute a violation of the act. The board
answered this contention by saying (1 N. L. R. B. at 269): "The respondent no doubt
has in mind the definition of an employee under Section 2, subdivision (3), providing
that the term 'employee' shall include one whose work has ceased as a consequence of
a current labor dispute. But Section 8, Subdivision (3) in forbidding discrimination
in employment, is not limited to those who are employees at the time of the discrimination. It forbids discrimination in regard 'to hire' generally.•.•"
The board's decision in the principal case was based on violation of section 8 (3)
as much as violation of section 8 (5), which latter section makes it an unfair labor
practice to refuse to bargain with the representatives of the employees.
15 Relatively few cases have reached the courts raising as an issue the power of
the board to order reinstatement of striking employees. In Jeffery-De Witt Insulator
Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, (C. C. A. 4th, 1937) 91 F. (2d) 134, cert.
denied (U. S. 1937) 58 S. Ct. 55, the facts were practically on all fours with the
principal case except that there was no express discharge of the striking employees, and
the board held the evidence did not sustain the finding that there was a violation of
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the specific orders of the board above enumerated, regardless of its interpretation of section 2 (3).
Edward J. Wendrow

section 8 (3). The holding of the board that a refusal to negotiate with employees
who struck prior to the act constituted a violation of section 8 (5) was affirmed. However, in National Labor Relations Board v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., (C. C. A.
9th, 1937) 87 F. (2d) 611, a.lfd. on rehearing, (C. C. A. 9th, 1937) 92 F. (2d) 761,
the court held on the first hearing that the order requiring the strikers to be re-employed
was a violation of the Fifth Amendment, and concluded in the rehearing that the
Board could only reinstate the employees to their former status, viz., that of a "striking
employee." This decision is based on the Adair and Coppage cases. However, in
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S. Ct.
615 (1937), it was specifically stated that these cases did not apply to the provisions
of the Wagner Act and an order of the board compelling reinstatement of employees
who were discharged for union activities was upheld. Hence, the Mackay decision
appears to be erroneous.

